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New York v. United States1: 
Constitutional Order or 
Commerce Clause Chaos? 
In quiet majesty a roman centurion guards the doorway to 
the national archives where the Constitution is displayed and 
honored. The inscription beneath him proclaims the message of 
a bygone age, that "[e]ternal vigilance is the price of liberty." 
This Note examines the conflict between the practical exigency 
of the moment and the long term security of the republic. On 
one hand, hazardous waste disposal presents a national crisis. 
On the other hand, measures designed to remedy this crisis 
pose serious threats to the constitutional division of power 
between federal and state governments. 
New York v. United States addresses a fundamental ques~ 
tion of the separation of powers between the federal govern~ 
ment and states.2 In New York, the Supreme Court struck 
down a provision of The Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985. This provision required states not 
complying with the Act to "take title" to offending waste within 
their borders, and be liable for resulting damage.3 
This Note examines the federalism values of local control 
and state sovereignty, and the impact of New York on these 
values. Part I of this Note examines the law Prior to New York. 
Part II is devoted to case history. Part III treats the Court's 
reasoning, and Part IV appraises that reasoning. 
I. PRIOR LAW 
The Court's opinion in New York is based on the Tenth 
Amendment protection of states' rights.4 In crafting her opin~ 
ion, Justice O'Connor relied heavily on analysis found in Hodel 
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation5 for the proposition 
1. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). 
2. ld. 
:3. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)(1985). 
4. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
fi. 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). 
377 
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that the federal government may not "commandeer state legis-
lative processes."6 In interpreting National League of Cities v. 
Usery, the Hodel Court set forth a three part test to determine 
whether congressional power is abused in violation of state's 
rights. 7 This approach, known as the state autonomy principle, 
serves as a barrier to federal regulation in areas of "traditional 
governmental functions."8 
The Usery Court's state autonomy barrier was an attempt 
to preserve federalism in the face of a broadly expanding com-
merce power. That power had become so enlarged that Con-
gress could regulate anything bearing on commerce no matter 
how remote the effect.9 Usery was the culmination of a line of 
opinions that demonstrated increasing sensitivity to state au-
tonomy.10 
The Usery decision was explicitly overruled in Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.n The Garcia 
Court held that "a rule of State immunity from federal regula-
tion that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular 
governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional"' is "unsound 
in principle and unworkable in practice."12 
We doubt that courts ultimately can identifY principled con-
stitutional limitations on the scope of Congress' Commerce 
Clause powers over States merely by relying on a priori defi-
nitions of State sovereignty. In part, this is because of the 
6. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420. 
7. The Court wrote: 
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the 
"States as States." Second, the federal regulation must address matters 
that are indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty." And, third, it 
must be apparent that the States' compliance with federal law would 
directly impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of 
traditional governmental functions." 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981) (con-
struing Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852-854, 896 (1976)); U.S. 
CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. a (Congress' power to regulate commerce). 
8. ld. 
9. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CoNSTITUTION 
39 (1991). See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 
(1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
10. E.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 
U.S. 183 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
11. 469 u.s. 5::12, 546-47 (1985). 
12. ld. 
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elusiveness of objective criteria for "fundamental" elements of 
State sovereignty, a problem we have witnessed in the search 
for "traditional governmental functions." 13 
Rather than relying on "judicially created limitations on federal 
power," the Court held that "procedural safeguards inherent 
within the structure of the federal system" would stand alone 
in protecting state autonomy. 14 Essentially, the Garcia Court 
rejected the Tenth Amendment as a judicially enforceable safe-
guard for state sovereignty and trusted in congressional re-
straint. 
The state autonomy defense began its resurgence in Grego-
ry v. Ashcroft. 15 In that case the Court upheld Missouri's con-
stitutional requirement that judges retire at age seventy16 
against a challenge that the provision violated the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). 17 Hearkening 
back to the "traditional governmental functions" approach, the 
Gregory Court found that determining the qualifications of 
state officers was "essential to the independence of the States," 
and that Congress could override this function only by making 
a "plain statement" declaring its intent to do so. 18 
II. HISTORY 
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act 
of 1985 was enacted pursuant to a proposal by the National 
Governors' Association. 19 The statute contained three provi-
sions intended to encourage states to develop policies for the 
disposal of low-level radioactive waste either individually or 
pursuant to interstate agreements. The first of these provisions 
was a "monetary incentive," which authorized states with dis-
posal sites to collect a surcharge for accepting waste during a 
13. !d. at 548. 
14. !d. at fifi3-fifi4. The Court specifically mentioned the states' direct role in 
the selection of the President and the Senate; their indirect role in choosing House 
members by virtue of their control of electoral qualifications; and the equal repre-
sentation of all states in the Senate. 
lfi. 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991). 
16. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 26. 
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1967). 
18. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2401-02 (1991) (construing Will v. 
Michigan State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scan-
lon, 4 73 U.S. 234, 242 (1985); U.S. v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971); and Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b (1985). 
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seven-year period. These surcharges would be taxed with the 
proceeds held in escrow and then disbursed to states complying 
with the Act. 20 The second provision was an "access incent-
ive," which allowed states with waste disposal sites to gradual-
ly multiply the authorized surcharges, and eventually to deny 
access to disposal sites. 21 The third provision required states 
failing to meet statutory deadlines to "take title" to, and posses-
sion, of the offending waste, thus rendering those states liable 
for resulting damages. 22 
The State of New York and Allegheny and Cortland coun-
ties sought a declaratory judgment that the stated provisions 
violated the Tenth Amendment and the constitutional guar-
antee of "a republican form of govemment."23 The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed the 
complaint24 and the Second Circuit affirmed.25 Finally, the 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the "monetary incentives" and the 
"access incentives," but struck down the "take title" provision 
on Tenth Amendment grounds.26 
III. THE COURT'S REASONING 
In New York, Justice O'Connor relied on Hodel27, which 
was founded on Usery28• For this reason Garcia29 , which ex-
plicitly overruled Usery, has been called into question. New 
York, accordingly, gives reason to reexamine the state autono-
my principle which was rejected in Garcia. 
The important difference between the Court's reasoning in 
New York and its pre-Garcia cases is the absence of the "tradi-
tional function" analysis in New York. In pre-Garcia cases, the 
Court focused on whether an activity was a "traditional func-
tion" of states in order to determine whether that activity war-
ranted Tenth Amendment protection.30 New York, by contrast, 
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 202le(d)(1), (2)(A).(B) (1985). 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(2) (1985). 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1985). 
23. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
24. New York v. United States, 757 F Supp 10 (N.D. N.Y. 1990). 
25. New York v. United States, 942 F. 2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991). 
26. New York, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). 
27. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
28. Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 838 (1976). 
29. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 532 (1985). 
80. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation, 452 U.S. 264, 2R7-RR; 
Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852-54, 896 (1976). 
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can be read as a structural partition of federal and state gov-
ernments, without regard to a substantive division of authority 
to regulate certain classes of issues. 
The intrusiveness of a regulation on state autonomy is 
determined by a series of principles. First, Congress may not 
simply "commandeer" a state's legislative process.31 Second, 
Congress may give states the option to implement a federal 
regulatory program or have their laws preempted by direct 
federal regulation. 32 
No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the 
Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to 
require the states to regulate. The Constitution instead gives 
Congress the authority to regulate matters directly and to 
preempt contrary state regulation. Where a federal interest is 
sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do 
so directly; it may not conscript state governments as its 
agents. 33 
Third, when Congress gives the states an alternative, one of 
the two options must be constitutional when considered with-
out alternatives. Fourth, Congress may attach conditions to the 
receipt of federal funds collected under the spending power to 
encourage states to regulate.34 Fifth, the foregoing principles 
are premised on the theory that the Constitution authorized 
the federal government to regulate individuals directly, but 
lacks the power to compel states. Finally, Congress lacks the 
power to regulate states' regulation of interstate commerce, but 
may regulate interstate commerce directly.35 
In New York, the Court found the "monetary" and "access" 
incentives constitutional because they provided constitutionally 
permissible alternatives to federal regulation. In the case of the 
"monetary" incentives, the Court characterized collection of a 
portion of the surcharge paid by waste depositors as a "federal 
tax on interstate commerce."36 The re-distribution of those 
funds to states complying with the federal program is autho-
rized under the spending power.37 
31. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420. 
32. !d. at 2428. 
33. !d. at 2429. 
34. !d. at 2423. 
35. ld. at 2423. 
36. !d. at 2426. 
37. !d. at 2426; U.S. CONf>'T. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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The "access" incentives authorized by Congress were simi-
larly characterized. The Court found authorization of an in-
creasing surcharge and eventual denial of access for hazardous 
materials traveling across state lines to be within Congress' 
power to discriminate against interstate commerce. As with the 
"monetary" incentives, the Court characterized the "access" 
incentives as an option to regulate according to federal guide-
lines, or to subject the state's radioactive waste producers to a 
regulation of interstate commerce.38 
The Court declared the "take title" provision unconstitu-
tional because "Congress ha[d] crossed the line distinguishing 
encouragement from coercion."39 The Court reasons that the 
"take title" provision is a forced subsidy to waste producers 
because it relieves the producer of its duty to dispose of the 
waste as a cost incident to doing business, and transfers that 
duty to state governments. Justice O'Connor reasoned that 
either the "take title" provision or a federal regulatory scheme 
directly imposed on the states, standing alone, is a violation of 
state sovereignty. This is so because both options "comman-
deer" states into "the service of federal regulatory purposes, 
and would for this reason be inconsistent with the 
Constitution's division of authority between federal and state 
governments". 40 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Federalism Principles 
Any discussion of states' rights is incomplete without a 
review of the federalism values that prompt the discussion. 
This Note will argue that local control provides efficient prob-
lem solving, greater safety for liberty, and an important check 
against federal tyranny. 
In Fedralist 46, James Madison argued for local control of 
matters that directly concern the citizens of the several states. 
This argument is premised on the notion that a government 
near the people is better equipped to meet their unique needs. 
Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former 
occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt, that the first and 
most natural attachment of the people will be to the govern-
38. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2427. 
39. ld. at 2428. 
40. ld. at 2428. 
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ments of their respective states ... By the superintending 
care of these, all the more domestic and personal interests of 
the people will be regulated and provided forY 
Second, local control of problems allows states to act as 
safe repositories of individual liberty. Since state domains are 
much smaller than the nation at large, they are easier to es-
cape. It is difficult for a government to become oppressive if 
individuals can freely escape its control and have a choice 
among varied regimes under which to live.42 
Madison's counter-argument suggests that local majority 
factions, which can prove threatening to individual liberty, can 
be checked by a strong national government.43 In balancing 
these two arguments, one must weigh the likelihood that idio-
syncratic factions will achieve a majority (which is more likely 
at the state level), against the potential damage of such a ma-
jority (which is far more dangerous at the national level be-
cause escape is more difficult). 
An example of the tension between state and federal con-
trol manifested itself in early debates over religious freedom. 
Madison believed that a strong federal government would oper-
ate against the political power of religious factions prominent 
within individual states.44 Contrary to Madison's desire, the 
language of the first amendment provides that "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof .... " This language prevented 
"Congress," from taking any steps to check the power of local 
religious factions, but states were not limited.45 If a particular 
religion dominated in an individual state, dissenters were at 
liberty to travel to a more tolerant state, and in the past have 
done so in great numbers. 46 
The controlling principle for dividing power between the 
federal government and states is to expressly enumerate the 
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 238 (James Madison) (Bantam ed., 1982). 
42. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMI'I'ING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 53 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating The Founders' 
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 150:-1-04 (1987). 
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). 
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 10,. at 48-49 (James Madison) (Bantam ed., 1982); 
JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 76 (address by James Madison) (W.W. Norton & Co. 
1966). 
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
46. McConnell, supra note 41, at 1505-06. 
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federal government's powers when there is broad national con-
sensus. The formula for ascertaining the existence of such a 
consensus is written into the Constitution which requires two-
thirds of both houses of Congress and three-quarters of the 
states to agree to give the federal government the powers in 
question.47 Where such consensus is lacking, it is proper to 
reserve those powers to the several states.48 
Third, an important federalism doctrine is the division of 
power between units of government. It is, today, a popular 
practice to disparage the "gridlock" in Washington D.C. Repub-
licanism is, however, inherently the least efficient among the 
forms of government. A monarch or dictator can be far more 
efficient in addressing national problems, needing no one's 
consent but his own. The virtue of republican government is 
not its efficiency, but rather, its safety. A system of checks and 
balances essential to protect liberty is, by definition, a system 
of "gridlock." Madison purposely formed a plan under which a 
degree of paralysis would prevail as a check on ambitious gov-
ernment power. 
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered 
by the people, is first divided between two distinct govern-
ments, and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided 
among the distinct and separate departments. Hence a double 
security arises to the rights of the people. The different gov-
ernments will controul [sic] each other; at the same time each 
will be controuled [sic] by itself.49 
To hold, as the Court did in Garcia, that checks and balances 
solely within the national government protect states rights, is 
to ignore a fundamental element of the federal plan. That is, 
that the rights of sovereign states are a second check against 
ambitious federal power. 
Aside from the "procedural safeguards" to states' rights 
referred to in Garcia,50 the balance between state and federal 
government is articulated in the Tenth Amendment and in the 
Constitution's Supremacy Clause. 51 The Tenth Amendment 
47. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
48. McConnell, supra note 41, at 1507 (referring to the formula for amending 
the Constitution). 
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 263-64 (James Madison) (Bantam ed., 1982). 
50. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 532, 552 (1985). 
51. The Supremacy Clause reads: 
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makes the federal government an institution of enumerated 
powers.52 On one hand, those powers not explicitly granted to 
the federal government may not be implied; they are reserved 
to the states or to the people.53 On the other hand, the su-
premacy clause makes federal law preeminent to state law 
where enumerated powers are concerned. The theory behind 
this design is to prevent too large a concentration of power in a 
single sovereign. 
B. A Dilemma For Federalism 
The majority opinion in New York v. United States could be 
read to interpret the Tenth Amendment as a direct protection 
of state sovereignty which proclaims only that the federal gov-
ernment may not commandeer the states.54 This reading is 
problematic for three reasons.55 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made 
in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made un-
der the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the 
land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in 
the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
fi2. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people." U.S. CoNST. amend. X. 
53. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 227, 237 (1868). The following statements illustrate 
that Tenth Amendment principles were part of the framers original design, despite 
the fact that they were not written into the original text: 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal govern-
ment, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the state gov-
ernments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised prin-
cipally on external objects, as war, peace, negociation [sic] and foreign 
commerce; with the last the power of taxation will for the most part be 
connected. The powers reserved to the several states will extend to all 
the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, 
liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improve-
ment, and prosperity of the State. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 236 (James Madison) (Bantam ed., 1982); 
An intire [sic] consolidation of the states into one complete national sover-
eignty would imply an intire [sic] subordination of the parts; and whatev-
er powers remain in them would be altogether dependent on the general 
will. But as the plan of the Convention aims only at a partial union or 
consolidation, the state governments would clearly retain all the rights of 
sovereignty which they before had, and which were not by that act exclu-
sively delegated to the United States. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam ed., 1982); 
fi4. 112 S. Ct. at 2428-35. 
fifi. None of these reasons should be read to suggest that the federal govern-
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First, the notion that the federal government may not 
"commandeer" the states is based on a mistaken premise. The 
majority relied, for its conclusion, on the theory that the federal 
government may act on individuals but not on states.56 If this 
were true, the Court should have found the "monetary incen-
tives" unconstitutional, since they tax states and distribute 
federal funds directly to state governments.57 Further, this 
theory implies that the federal government operates on a direct 
grant of power from the people and not from the states.58 Al-
though this was the position of some who attended the federal 
convention, these arguments were made by those who favored 
proportional representation in both houses of Congress.59 Oth-
ers had favored a confederation where the federal government 
existed only to preserve the states.60 The Court's premise is 
mistaken because the federal government derives its powers 
from a mixed grant of authority from the people and the from 
the states.61 House members represent proportional numbers 
of individuals, thus giving the federal government an element 
of direct majority rule. Madison explained that each of the 
states is equally represented in the senate, giving states a voice 
equal to the citizens at large. Madison further points out that 
the bicameral system creates a second check on legislation 
since "[n]o law or resolution can now be passed without first 
the concurrence of a majority of the people, and then a majority 
of the states."62 
ment has the power to intrusively regulate states. They should demonstrate that 
the state sovereignty is protected by the federal government's limitation to its 
enumerated powers, and not by a direct prohibition against "commandeering" the 
states. 
56. !d. at 2423; Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868). 
57. See also, New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2446 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing 
areas in which Congress issues "a simple command" to state governments to legis-
late). 
58. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 7 YALE L.J. 1425, 1429-
66 (19R7). 
59. E.g., JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 35 (paraphrasing George Mason), 127-129 
(paraphrasing Edmund Randolph) (W.W. Norton & Co., 1966). 
60. E.f.!., JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 200-204 (paraphrasing Luther Martin), 57 
(paraphrasing John Dickinson) (W.W. Norton & Co., 1966). 
61. E.g., JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 211 (paraphrasing William Samuel John-
son), 77 (paraphrasing John Dickinson), 78 (paraphrasing William Pierce) (W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1966). 
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 314, (James Madison) (Bantam ed., 1982). 
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Second, if Congress is to "regulate commerce . . . among 
the several states," it must necessarily place restraints upon 
the activities in which states are free to engage, which has the 
effect of "commandeer[ing]."63 To regulate, by very definition, 
is to "commandeer." In New York, the Court found that denying 
a state federal funds and requiring its citizens to pay a tax as 
an alternative to regulating was "encouragement," but impos-
ing title and liability for hazardous waste was "coercion."64 
While there may be a formal distinction between denying affir-
mative grants of funding, and requiring the state to make ex-
penditures out of its own coffers, there is little substantive dif-
ference. As Justice White pointed out in his dissenting opinion, 
"the Court isolates the measure analytically and proceeds to 
dissect it in a syllogistic fashion."65 This is illustrated by the 
theoretical possibility that the federal government could offer 
disbursements of several billion dollars to the states as incen-
tives to regulate. Altematively, the federal govemment could 
impose a fine of a few thousand dollars on states that refuse to 
regulate. If both of these possibilities were offered as "incen-
tives" to regulate, reason dictates that the denial of several 
billion dollars is more persuasive than the possibility of being 
required to spend a few thousand. Whether any altemative to 
regulation is "encouragement" or "coercion" to regulate is less a 
matter of form than of degree. 
Third, the independence of powerless states is useless. 
Since 1937, the Court has been laboring under an interpreta-
tion of the Commerce Clause that allows Congress unlimited 
authority to legislate virtually any issue, and to preempt state 
law on that issue.66 The rule that the federal government can-
not "commandeer" the states might preserve the independence 
of states, but leaves them no constitutionally guaranteed res-
ervoir of power. This contaminates the federalism principle 
that power should be divided between two independent sov-
ereigns, each with enough constitutional power to exercise 
63. See THE FEDERALIST No. 11 (Alexander Hamilton). 
64. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2427-28. 
65. ld. at 2438, (White, J., dissenting). 
66. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 
39 (1991). See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 532 (1985); 
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 
(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 812 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
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leverage against the other. Ideally, the federal government has 
powers on which the states cannot encroach because of the 
supremacy of federal law over state law. In turn, the states 
have powers on which the federal government cannot encroach, 
because they are not specifically enumerated, and therefore, 
are beyond federal reach under the Tenth Amendment. 
Fourth, the rule that the federal government may not "co-
mmandeer" the states sacrifices one federalism value (local 
control) to one of its counterparts (the independent sovereignty 
of the state). If the federal government's only regulatory option 
is to exercise an unlimited commerce power to preempt state 
law, then it will do so at the expense of "local solutions."67 On 
the other hand, if Congress is permitted to force states to regu-
late, federalism values of local control will be nourished while 
the federalism principle of state autonomy is sacrificed. 
C. Escaping the Dilemma 
One of two possible readings of New York, will govern in 
future cases. One reading is formalistic, and the other substan-
tive. The formalistic reading decides the case according to the 
state autonomy principle. Such a reading takes a structural 
approach to state autonomy, allowing the federal government 
to "encourage," but not to "coerce" state legislatures. Such a 
reading gives rise to all of the aforementioned problems. 
A preferrable reading of New York decides the matter 
based on a substantive analysis of the Commerce Clause. 68 
Prior to Garcia, the Hodel Court attempted a substantive anal-
ysis of states' rights. Hodel adopted a three-pronged test inter-
preting Usery, holding that the federal government could not 
legislate issues that were traditionally functions of state 
law.69 Subsequent cases also held that the state autonomy 
defense would not apply to previously unregulated areas be-
cause they were not "traditional function[s]" of state govern-
ment. 70 Usery was erroneous because it relied on the "general 
structure of the Constitution," rather than on the language of 
67. "The ultimate irony of the decision today is that in its formalistically rigid 
obeisance to 'federalism,' the Court gives Congress fewer incentives to defer to the 
wishes of state officials in achieving local solutions to local problems." New York, 
112 S.Ct. at 2446 (White, J., dissenting). 
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
69. See supra, note 6. 
70. E.g. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 457 U.S. 678 (1982). 
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the Tenth Amendment or some other express constitutional 
provision. 71 The Usery Court effectively rewrote and reversed 
the presumption of the Tenth Amendment, giving the federal 
government the residue of all powers not previously assumed 
by the states. 72 Although misguided, at least "traditional func-
tion" analysis recognized a substantive limit to federal power, 
which was explicitly overruled in Garcia.73 The Court later 
made an attempt to limit Garcia by requiring a "plain state-
ment" of intent to preempt an "essential state function."74 
In determining whether a regulation is constitutional, one 
must ascertain whether it falls within one of the Constitution's 
substantive powers. The language of the Tenth Amendment 
teaches that if a power is not "delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution," it belongs to the states unless specifically 
"prohibited."75 Congress does not overreach its powers by the 
manner or form in which it legislates, but rather by legislating 
on issues that fall outside its Constitutional grant of power. 
New York, therefore, should be read as an inquiry into whether 
the provisions at issue are within Congress' enumerated power 
to "regulate commerce among the several states."76 
In characterizing the "monetary incentives," the Court held 
that, "[t]he [monetary incentive] is an unexceptionable exercise 
of Congress' power to burden interstate commerce."77 In ex-
plaining its holding the Court reasoned that, "[ w ]hether or not 
the states would be permitted to burden the interstate trans-
port of low level radioactive waste in the absence of Congress' 
approval, the states can clearly do so with Congress' approval, 
which is what the Act gives them."78 Most important of all, 
the Court held that "[b]ecause the first set of incentives is sup-
ported by affirmative constitutional grants of power to Con-
gress, it is not inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment."79 
71. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITliTION, 
42 (1991). 
72. ld. 
73. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 532, 546-47 (1985). 
74. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2401-02 (1991) (construing Will v. 
Michigan State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 6fi (1989); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scan-
lon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985); U.S. v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971); and Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
75. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
76. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
77. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2425-26. 
78. ld. at 2426. 
79. ld. at 2427. 
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The foregoing analysis permits the reader to conclude that 
the "monetary incentives" at issue in New York were constitu-
tional because they fall within an enumerated power as requir-
ed by the Tenth Amendment.80 
The Court's Commerce Clause analysis of the "access in-
centives" was similar to its analysis of the "monetary incen-
tives." The majority held that the "access incentives" fall "with-
in Congress' power to discriminate against interstate com-
merce." 81Mter concluding that the "access incentive" was with-
in an enumerated power, the Court held that it satisfied the 
demands of the Tenth Amendment.82 
The Court struck down the "take title" provision of the Act 
because the provisiOn "commandeers" state legislative 
processes.83 In explaining its ruling, the Court painstakingly 
analyzed the "choice" offered to the states. Essentially, the 
"choice" is between regulating radioactive waste according to 
federal guidelines, or being forced to take title to, and liability 
for the offending waste. 84 
A commerce clause reading of New York suggests that 
Congress does not have power to mandate the regulation of 
waste generated within the borders of a state as long as the 
waste remains in the state. Under this reading, the federal 
government's enumerated commerce powers can only prevent 
waste from becoming an article of interstate commerce or regu-
late it after it has become an article of interstate commerce. 
The "take title" alternative is subject to similar analysis. The 
federal government attempts to require states to "take title" to 
matter generated within their borders, not conditioned upon 
80. The enumerated power referred to is the Commerce Power from U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § R, cl. 3. It is noteworthy that the Court also undertakes a lively 
discussion of justification for the disbursal of funds under the spending power and 
the taxing power enumerated in U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. For purposes of this 
Note, it is sufficient to observe that the provision was justified according to enu-
merated powers. Commentary centers more on the expansion of a single enumerat-
ed power (the Commerce Clause) as creating a federalism dilemma. 
81. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2427. 
82. Justice O'Connor wrote: 
The Act's second set of incentives thus represents a conditional excercise 
of Congress' commerce power along the lines of those we have held to be 
within Congress' authority. As a result, the second set of incentives does 
not intrude on the sovereignty reserved to the states by the Tenth A-
mendment. 
New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2427. 
83. ld. at 2420. 
84. ld. at 2428. 
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the matter leaving the state, or in any other way being thrust 
into the stream of commerce. 
Because an instruction to state governments to take title to 
waste, standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Con-
gress, and because a direct order to regulate, standing alone, 
would also be beyond the authority of Congress, it follows 
that Congress lacks the power to offer the States a choice be-
tween the two.85 
Reading New York to establish that regulations must fit 
within substantive enumerated powers is preferable to constru-
ing it as a formalistic resurrection of the state autonomy de-
fense. If New York is read as a structural protection for state 
autonomy, it might provide for the independence of states, but 
would not restrict how far the federal government could reach 
in preempting state law. It is not enough for states to be inde-
pendent of federal influence if they retain no power to act. If 
the commerce power is all inclusive, then congressional author-
ity to overrule states remains unlimited and federalism values 
are without protection. The Court recognized in Garcia that 
limits could not be placed on the commerce power by an appeal 
to definitions of state autonomy.86 
1. The Scope of the Commerce Power 
If the Court reads New York as deciding the fate of regula-
tions according to whether or not they fall within the commerce 
power, at least four conclusions may be drawn about the com-
merce power. First, Congress may exercise it to burden or dis-
criminate against articles of interstate commerce, or to prevent 
items from becoming articles of interstate commerce.87 Second, 
Congress may not place regulations on goods outside the 
stream of interstate commerce, except to prevent them from 
coming into the stream of interstate commerce, or to burden 
them after they arrive.88 Third, Congress may not compel 
states to subsidize or regulate local industries.89 Fourth, if 
8fi. Id. at 2428. 
86. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 532, 548 (1985). 
H7. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2425-27. 
88. See Id. at 2428-29. 
R9. !d. at 2428. 
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articles become the subject of interstate commerce, the federal 
government may regulate them directly.90 
The establishment of these four principles would constitute 
a significant retreat from the line of cases culminating in Gar-
cia which grossly expanded the commerce power.91 The Court 
began this expansion in an effort to avoid President Roosevelt's 
famous "court packing plan" during the ''New Deal" era.92 This 
landslide of expansion leading up to Garcia broadened the 
reach of the commerce power and eventually relinquished the 
authority to review federalism questions altogether. By 
adopting a substantive reading of New York, the Court can 
bring the commerce power within reasonable limits, and pre-
serve state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment's mech-
anism for apportioning power. 
2. The Substance of the Commerce Power 
Originally, the commerce power was intended to promote 
positive commercial relationships, and for the most part free 
trade, among the citizens of the several states. 93 This would, 
in turn, facilitate bargaining power for the Union and more 
advantageous trade agreements with other nations.94 In this 
pursuit, the states had the power to impose tariffs and duties 
"absolutely necessary for the execution of its inspection 
laws."95 This provision would allow states a reasonable conve-
nience in regulating their imports and exports, but allow for a 
federal check on abuses. 96 Furthermore, the founders under-
stood the relationships between such things as manufacturing, 
trade and real estate values, and crafted the commerce clause 
to provide for uniformity in America's trade strategy. Such 
uniformity was to be achieved primarily by federal regulation 
of tariffs, duties and interstate trade routes and resources.97 
90. !d. at 2429. 
91. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 532 (1985); Perez 
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 
(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
92. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPI'ING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 51-57 (1990). 
93. THE FEDERAL!b'T No. 41 (James Madison) No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton). 
94. !d. 
95. U.S. CONST. art. X, cl. 2. 
96. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 227-28 (James Madison) (Bantam ed., 1982). 
97. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 11, 12 (Alexander Hamilton); JAMES MADISON, NOTES 
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Consistent with this Note's suggested reading of New York 
and with the framers of the Constitution, the commerce power 
could be reduced to the power to regulate: (1) The mechanisms 
of interstate commerce; and (2) The objects of interstate com-
merce while they are in the sphere of interstate commerce. Cer-
tain articles of commerce, such as rivers and other natural 
resources that transcend state boundaries are perpetually in 
the sphere of interstate commerce and would always be within 
federal control. Other objects are in the sphere of interstate 
commerce only during commercial transactions that cross state 
boundaries. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The commerce clause is a general power and was created 
in vague terms to accommodate the many complexities of com-
merce.98 Nonetheless, no enumerated power should be limit-
less, and the foregoing principles can provide a positive direc-
tion for future limits intended to restore balance in the federal 
system. Merely protecting states from federal intervention will 
not provide the checks and balances of the federal design. In-
stead, the federal government must be limited to its enumerat-
ed powers. Such powers, themselves, must be limited, leaving 
the states a substantial reservoir of power. 
Some have argued that past centralization of government 
power has "fatally compromised" the intentions of the federal 
plan.99 It is true that many institutionalized abridgments of 
the federal design are so deeply entrenched that their removal 
would be nearly impossible. Having conceded this, it remains 
unwise to further consolidate power in a federal head in viola-
tion of the Constitution. 10° Fidelity to the Constitutional or-
der is critical for preserving freedom to future generations. In 
his dissenting opinion in New York, Justice White seemed to 
disagree: 
OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADI-
SON fi44 (comment by James Madison) (W.W. Norton & Co. 1966). 
98. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 644 (comment by James Madison) (W.W. Nor-
ton & Co. 1966). 
99. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POUTICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 15fi (1990). 
100. ld. 
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Ultimately, I suppose, the entire structure of our federal con-
stitutional government can be traced to an interest in estab-
lishing checks and balances to prevent the excercise of tyran-
ny against individuals. But these fears seem extremely far 
distant to me in a situation such as this. We face a crisis of 
national proportions in the disposal of low-level radioactive 
waste .... 101 
However tempting it may be, it is unwise to allow present 
expediencies and the seductive appeal of streamlined govern-
ment to override the checks and balances necessary to main-
tain the rights of American citizens. 
Jeffrey B. Teichert 
101. New York, 112 S .. Ct. at 2444 (White, J., dissenting). 
